Abstract: Financial Crisis in 2008 raised the debate again of whether corporate governance failure should be blamed. Lots of research has discussed the close relationships between corporate governance and risk control. However, empirical study, especially from the whole scenario of financial risk management of non-financial firm, is limited. In this article, I
referred to a mature corporate governance appraisal framework CCGINK and a
new corporate financial risk management system of SASAC to establish a three-layer corporate governance measurement system, including relationships between shareholders and managers, between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and among all stakeholders, and a financial risk framework for non-financial firms. Then through multiple regression between two groups of indices, I suppose to find the answer to the question which aspects of corporate governance are able to control which elements of financial risks of non-financial firms. The research conclusion will provide pragmatic implications to policy makers and corporate executives for their regulation and management practice.本文来自辣.文~论^文·网原文请找腾讯324,9114
Key Words: Corporate Governance Agency problem Financial risk Risk management
Ⅰ. Introduction 会计论文参考文献及英文文献翻译
The Financial Crisis across the globe and the ramifications for the rest of the global economy in 2008 and 2009 raised the concern, another time, whether the failure is the one of Corporate Governance. According to OECD’s most recent report by Richard Anderson, Corporate Governance alone is not the cause of the current Financial Crisis. However, Corporate Governance could have prevented some of the worst aspects of the crisis had effective governance operated throughout the period of time during which the problems were developing and before they crystallized. Furthermore, effective Corporate Governance could have helped to reduce the catastrophic impacts that the global and national economies are now suffering.
Corporate Governance is a complex concept with close relevance to economics, finance, laws and management. Through researching institutional changes among shareholders, boards, managers and other interest groups in micro-economics world, corporate governance takes key role in improving corporate performance, especially for public corporations. According to McKinsey’s serial reports, investors are willing to pay above 20% premium for good corporate governance. Also, failures of firms’ reform in Eastern Europe and Russia, from the perspective of asset control, which led to substantial diversion of assets by managers of many privatized firms and the virtual non-existence of external capital supply to firms (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny
1995), informed us that we can not avoid the influence of this deeper
management mechanism beneath property rights allocation and protection,2390