The plush droplight of Sinopec and the employee group house-purchasing of CNPC with low price in 2009 disclosed the high principal-agent risk in corporate governance of SOEs. Besides, a large number of corporatized SOEs remain dominated by a single state shareholder that exercises its control either through formal channels, such as shareholder voting, or through traditional channels, such as the acknowledged authority of the Communist Party’s organizational department over personnel appointments in key state-owned and state-controlled enterprises, whether or not corporatized and listed on the stock market (Clarke, 2003). Relationship-based deals expropriate the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. In
2005, China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) applied Temasek Holdings management model into Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation as an experiment site for Board of Directors Reform. The SOEs further reform needs deeper research in the area of corporate governance and risk control, especially financial risk management.本文来自辣.文~论^文·网原文请找腾讯3249-114
The purpose of this study is to address the questions as followings:
1) Will corporate governance be an effective risk controller in enterprises’
financial risk management?东莞出口企业应收账款问题现状及对策+文献综述+开题报告+任务书
2) Which factors in corporate governance will mitigate or avoid what kind of financial risk elements?
If we can answer these questions, we may provide concrete advice to policy
makers and corporate managers to adapt their management and governance methods rather than just pinpoint the problem. This empirical study of relationship between corporate governance and risk management should have pragmatic implications for further firm application and government policy making.
Ⅱ.Brief Literature Review
1. Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance was first mentioned as a concept in Willianmson’s article On the Governance of the Modern Corporation (Willianmson, Oliver E.,1979). In the following 30 years, Corporate Governance (CG) has become one of the most important ingredients of theories of modern firm, although it is still a new concept even in developed markets such as United States and United Kingdom. As Berglof contended, CG has been a dominant policy issue in developed market economics for more than a decade and one of the most hotly contested issues in the transition economies since the mid-90’s (Berglof,
1999). However, the numerous debates on corporate governance have not provided us a consensus on CG’s conception in the worldwide so far.