performance.
Regardlessofthereasonfortheover-investment,truthfulreportingmighthavepreventedit.
Severalpartiesaretypicallyinvolvedi ninvestmentdecisions,includingmanagerswhotnakethe
decisiontoinvest,boardswhoreviewthecapitalbudget,andexternalsuppliersofcapital.I f
financialresultsarereportedtruthfully,thenotherpartiescouldstepi ntocurtailtheinvestment.
Asaresult,firmsinvestmorethantheyotherwisewouldhave,andattemptstomeetcapitalmarket
expectationsormeetbonustargets,forexample,couldaffectinvestors,employees,customers,and
abroadsetofrelatedparties.
Ourstudyprovidesevidenceonwhetherearningsmanagementaifectsresourceallocationby
examiningthecapitalexpendituredecisionsofthreegroupsoffirmsallegedtohavemanipulated
earnings—firmsinvestigatedbytheSECfo raccountingirregularities,firmssuedbytheirshareholdersfo rimproperaccounting,andfirmsthatrestatedfinancialstatements.Thesesamplescomprisefirmsthathaveoverstatedearningssubstantially,whichgivesusgreaterconfidencethatwe
haveidentifiedearningsmanipulatorsandthatthemagnitudeoftheirearningsmanipulationcould
significantlyaffectinvestmentdecisions.Bothofthesefactorsarecrucialtothepowerofourtests.
However,becauseofconcernsaboutpotentialselectionbiasandtotestwhethertheeffectwefind
generalizesbeyondthemostseverecasesofearningsmanipulation,wealsousediscretionary
revenuestoidentifyfirmsthatmanipulatedearnings.本文来自辣,文'论*文^网原文请找腾讯752018766
Ourdataidentifiestheperiodforwhichmanipulationisalleged,andpermitsusto
examinetheinvestmentdecisionsi ntheyearsbefore,during,andsubsequenttothemanipulation.
Underthenullhypothesisthatearningsmanagementdoesnotresulti nresourcemisallocation,
firmsshouldexhibitinvestmentlevelsconsistentwiththeirfundamentals.Ourstudyfollowsan
extensiveliteraturethatmodelsinvestmentdecisionsusingalinearmodelrelatingcapitalexpenditurestoinvestmentopportunities.Specifically,thesemodelscontrolfo rinvestmentopportunities
usingTobin'sQandcashfro moperations.Ourtestsexaminetheinvestmentdecisionsi nthe
manipulationandpost-manipulationperiods.First,wetestwhetherfirmsoverstatingearnings
over-investduringthemanipulationperiod.Second,weexaminewhetherover-investmentis
eliminatedonceearningsarenolongermanipulated.I ffirmsover-investduringthemanipulation
periodforareasonotherthantheeffectofniisleadinginformation,thenwewouldnotexpecta
declinei ninvestment(aftercontrollingfordeclininginvestmentopportunities)whenearningsare
nolongermanipulated.
Thefindingsindicatethatfirmsmanipulatingearningsdoover-investinthemisreporting
period.Wefindsignificantlygreaterinvestmentthanwouldbeexpectedbasedoninvestment
fundamentals.Additionaltest. susingmatchedcontrolfirmssuggestthatsamplefirmsinvestmore
thantheywouldhavehadtheynotoverstatedtheirearnings.Whilesampleandcontrolfirms
exhibitsomeover-investmentbeforethemanipulationperiod,controlfirmsreducethelevelof
investment,whereassamplefirmscontinueover-investingduringthemanipulationperiod.Finally
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