theevidenceindicatesthatsamplefirmscurbover-investmentfollowingthemisreportingperiod.
Thesefindingssuggestthatanimportantconsequenceofeamingsmanagementisitseffecton
firms'investmentdecisions.
Ourtestsusingmeasuresofdiscretionaryrevenuesallowustoconfirmthemainfindingsand
alsotoinvestigatefurtherthetimingoftheeamingsmanagementandexcessinvestment.Granger
causalitytestsareconsistentwitheamingsmanagementleadingexcessinvestmentratherthan
earningsmanagementoccurringi nresponseto(e.g..tocoverup)pastsuboptimalinvestment.
Takentogether,ourfindingsacrossseveralapproachesusingmultiplemeasuresofeamings
managementandexcessinvestmentsupportourhypothesisthateamingsmanagementaffects
firms'investmentdecisions.Wesee ktoprovideadditionalsupportfo rthishypothesisbyniling
outaltemativeexplanationsfo rourresults.Ourevidencedoesnotindicatethatover-investmentis
solelyaresultoffirmsobtainingrelativelyinexpensivecxtemalfinancingbecauseweseesimilar
pattemsofover-investmenti nfirmswithlo wandhighlevelsofexternalfinancing.Ourtívidence
doesnotsupportthehypothesisthatfirmsmanipulatingeamingsover-investtoptK) lwithtnore
successfulfirmstotherebyavoiddetection:wefindthatsamplefirmsinvestmorethancontrol
firms,whichisinconsistentwithapoolingargument.Finally,ourevidenceisnotconsistentwith
thenotionthatfirmsfacingpoorretumstopastover-investmentoverstateeamingstomaskthe
poorfinancialresults.First,wefindthatfirmscontintietoover-investwhiletheymanijnilate
earnings,whichisunexpectedforafirmalreadyfacingpoorinvestmentretums.I naddition,using
Grangercausalitytestswefindthateamingsmanagementleadsexcessinvestment.Whileour
tindingsaresuhjecttothecaveatthatwedonotobservetheinvestmentdecisionpriKessdirectly,
weconcludethatthemostplausibleexplanationisthateamingsmanagementdistortsinformation
usedbythoseinvolvedi nfirms'investmentdecisions.
Thesefindingscontributetotheemergingliteratureontherolefinancialstatementinformationplaysininvestingdecisions.RecentstudiessuchasBiddle;in dHilary(2006),Verdi(2006),
andBushmanetal.(2006)findrelationshipsbetweenpropertiesofaccountinginformationand
investmentdecisions.However,thesestudiesdonotatldresswhetherintentionaldistortionsi n
accountingnumbersaffectinvestment.Ourstudyalsocontributestotheliteraturerelatingciu-nings
managementandresourceallocation.Ourfindingssuggestthateamingsmanagementcanlea dto
adirectcosttoinvestorsi nthefor mofinefficientinvestments.
Thelayoutofthepaperisasfollows.Sectit)nI Idiscussesrelatedliterature.SectionII I
describesourhypotheses.SectionIVdescribesourresearchdesign,SectionVpresentsourempiricalfindings,andSectionI Vconcludes.本文来自辣,文'论*文^网原文请找腾讯752018766
U.RELATEDLITERATURE
Incentive.stoManageEarnings
Priorliteratureoneamingsmanagementexaminesvariousaltemativehypothesesabtuitwhy
firmsmanipulateearnings.Motivationsfo reamingsmanagementi nthesestudiesincludeinfluencingthetermsofcompensationanddebtcontracts,influencingregulators,andinfluencing
equityprices."Collectively,thisliteraturesuggeststhattheincentivestomanipulateeamingsarise
i nanumberofcontexts.I nthisstudy,weexamineapotentialconsequenceofeamingsmanagement,regardlessofmanagers'motivations.Todate,therehasbeenlittlefocusonhoweamingimanagementaffectsintemaldecisiotis,suchascapitalinvestment.
SeeHealyandWahlen(1999),McNichoIs(2000,2002).andDechowan
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