EarningsManagementandResourceAllocation
Thepriorliteratureoneamingstnanagetnentprovideslimitedevidenceonwhethermisreportingtoinvestorsresultsi nresourcetnisallocation.AsHealyandWahlen(1999)note,onlyasmall
partoftheearningsmanagementliteratureaddressestheconsequencesofeamingsmanagementon
resourceallocation,andthefindingsofthisliteraturearemixed.Onestreamofthisliterature
examineswhethereamingsmanagementcontributestoIPOmispricing.Forexample,
Teohetal.(1998)concludethateamingsmanagementcontributestoIP Omispricing.
However,Bravetal.(2000)findthatthelong-runretumsofIPOsaresimilartothoseofseasoned
firmswithsimilarmarketcapitalization,suggestingthefindingsmaybeduetoamorepervasive
retumpattemi nthebroadersampleofpubliccompanies.
Asecondstreamofliterature,includingFoster(1979),Dechowetal.(1996),Beneish(1997),
andPalmroseetal.(2004),findsthatthemarketreactiontodisclosureofmisleadingreportingis
significantlynegative,indicatingthatinvestorswerenotcompletelyawareofthemanipulation.
Nevertheless,totheextentequityinvestorshaverationalexpectationsoftheamountofmanipulationoccurring,eveni ftheycamiotidentifythemagnitudefo rspecificcompanies,onecould
observenegativeretumstoannouncementsexpostthatwouldnotnecessarilyimplyresources
weremisallocatedexante.
Athirdstreamofliteratureexamineswhetherfirmsmanipulaterealdecisionstomanage
eamings.Forexample,Bushee(1998)examineshowresearchanddevelopment(R&D)spending
isaffectedbyincentivestomeeteamingstargets,andwhetherthisisinfluencedbythecompositionofthefirm'sinstitutionalinvestors.Anotherexampleistheopportunistictimingbybanksof
salesofheld-for-salesecurities(Barthetal.1990).Whilethisstreamofliteratureexaminesthe
relationbetweeneamingsmanagementandrealdecisions,thefocusisondistortingrealdecisions
toachieveaneamingstarget.Ourstudy,i ncontrast,askswhetherrealdecisionsaredistorted
becauseeamingsmanagementresultsindistortedinformationforintemaldecisionmakers.
EamingsManagementandInvestmentDecisions
Thoughourstudyisthefirstweareawareoftotestwhethereamingsmanagementleadsto
inefficientinvestmentdecisionsbyprovidingdistortedinformationtodecisionmakers,otherstudieshavepositedandtestedtheoriesrelatingtothelinkbetweeneamingsmanagementandfirms'
investmentdecisions.Dechowetal.(1996)studyfirmstargetedbySECenforcementactionsand
concludesthatadesiretoattractextemalfinancingatlowcostisanimportantmotivationfor
eamingsmanipulation.Presumably,thesefundsarethenusedfo rcapitalinvestment.Managers
consideringprofitableinvestmentprojectsbutfacingfinancingconstraintsmightmanipulateeamingsi nordertoobtainfinancingfo rinvestment.However,itisnotclearwbythesetnanagers
wouldover-investratherthaninvestoptimallywiththefundsobtained.Ourpredictionofoverinvestmentreliesondistortedinformationbeingusedbyinvestmentdecisionmakers,ratherthan
justadesiretoraiseadditionalcapital.
AtheoreticalpaperbyBar-GillandBebchuk(2003)predictsthatinefficientinvestment
projectswillmorelikelybeundertakenbycompaniesthatmisreportedpriortoundertakingthe
projectbecausefirmsoverstatingtheirfinancialresultswillbeabletoobtaincheaperfinancing.
Evidencei nsupportofthishypothesisisfoundbyWang(2006).Wang(2006)find sthatmisreportingfirmsaremorelikelytoover-investi nR&Dandstock-financedmergersandacquisitions.
Ourhypothesisdoesnotprecludecheapfinancinghavinganeffectoninvestments—wetest
whetherover-investmentoccursregardlessofexternalfinancing.
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