AconcurrentstudybyKediaandPhilippon(2009)predictsthatfirmsoverstatingtheirfinancialresuit.spoolwithbetterperformingfirmstoavoiddetection.Thesefirmsover-investtomitnic本文来自辣,文'论*文^网原文请找腾讯752018766
firmstruthfullyreportingstrongerresults.Ourstudytestsadifferenthypiithesis.Ratherthan
arguingthatbad-typeñrmsknowinglyreplicatetheinvestmentdecisionsofgoodtypeHrms.we
considerthepossibilitythatatleastoneofthepartiesinvolvedintheinvestmentdecisioni. smisled
hythemisstatedaccountinginformation.Wefindthatsamplefirmsinvestmorethanmatched
controlfirms,whichisinconsistentwithapoolingargument.
EarningsQualityandInvestmentDecisions
Ourstudyrelatestotlieemergingliteratureontherolefinancialstatementinformationplays
i ninvestingdecisions.Forexample,BiddleandHilary(2006)andVerdi(2006)predictandfin d
thatbetteraccountinginformationreducesinformationasymmetrybetweenmanagersandoutside
suppliersofcapital,allowingformoreefficientinvestment.BiddleandHilary(2006)findthat
measuresofaccountingqualityarenegativelyrelatedtoinvestmeni-cash-flowsen.sitivities.indicatingthattheeffectoffinancingconstraintsoninvestmentislowertortirmswithbigheraccountingquality.Verdi(2006)findsaccrualsqualityissignificantlynegativelyassociatedwithboth
over-investmentandunder-investment.
Bushmanetal.(2(X)6 )arguethattimelyaccountingrecognitionofeconomiclossesmakes
managerslesslikelytoengagei nexantenegativenetpresentvalueinvestmentprojects.Theyfind
tbatmoretimelyaccountingrecognitionofeconomiclossescurbsover-investmentbymanagers
facedwitbdeclininginvestmentopportunities—theinvestmentresponsetodeclininginvestment
opportunitiesdecreaseswhenlossrecognitionismoretimely.However,thesestudiesdonot
addresswhetherintentionaldistortionsi naccountingnumbersaffectinvestment.
III .HYPOTHESES
Wetestwhetherearningsmanagementaffectsinvestmentdecisions.Investmentdecisions
dependonexpectationsofthebenefitsoftheinvestment,whichi nturndependonexpeciationsof
futuregrowthandproductdemand.Expectationsoffuturegrowtharebasedoninformationthat
includesrevenuesandearnings.Inadditiontomerelyconcealingtheactualperformanceduring
theperiod,misstatedfinancialresultscanmaskunderlyingtrendsi nrevenueandearningsgrowth.
I nfact,Richardsonetal.(2002)findthatfirmsthatrestatefinancialresultstendtobegrowing
firmsattemptingtoreportconsecutiveearningsincreases.Thus,overstatementsofrevenuesand
earningsarelikelytodistortexpectationsofgrowthbythoseunawareoftheniisstatemenl.
Itispossiblethatinvestmentdecisionmakerswithinthefinnbelievethemisreportedgrowth
trend—duetoeithertheirownover-optimismorunawarenessofthemi.sstatement"—andinvest
accordingly.Alternatively,investmentdecisionmakersmightunderstandtbetruestateofthefirm
butchoosetoover-investi nahigh-riskapproachtommperfnnnancearound.''
Regardlessofthereasonfortheover-investment,weclaimthattruthfulreportingcould
havepreventedit.Severalpartiesaretypicallyinvolvedi ninvestmentdecisicms,includingman
agerswhomakethedecisiontoinvest,boardswhoreviewthecapitalbudget,andexternalsuppliersofcapital.Hadfinancialresultsbeenreportedtruthfully,accesstocapitalmighthavebeen
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