IPv6在校园网中的应用-IP安全分析 第6页
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Access control: A security service that prevents unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource to which access is being controlled is often:
For a host, computing cycles or data.
For a security gateway, a network behind the gateway or bandwidth on that network.
Date origin authentication: A security service that verifies the identity of the claimed source of data. This service is usually bundled with connectionless integrity service.
Confidentiality: The security service that protects data from unauthorized disclosure. The primary confidentiality concern in most instances is unauthorized disclosure of application-level data, but disclosure of the external characteristics of communication also can be a concern in some circumstances. Traffic flow confidentiality is the service that addresses, message length, or frequency of communication. In the IPsec context, using ESP in tunnel mode, especially at a security gateway, can provide some level of traffic flow confidentiality
Availability: When viewed as a security service, addresses the security concerns engendered by attacks against networks that deny or degrade service. For example, in the IPsec context, the use of anti-replay mechanisms in AH and ESP support availability
Limited traffic flow confidentiality: The analysis of network traffic flow for the purpose of deducing information that is useful to an adversary. Examples of such information are frequency of transmission, the identities of the conversing parties, sizes of packets, and flow identifiers
Integrity: A security service that ensures that modifications to data are detectable. Integrity comes in various flavors to match application requirements. IPsec supports two forms of integrity: connectionless and a form of partial sequence integrity. Connectionless integrity is a service that detects modification of an individual IP datagram, without regard to the ordering of the datagram in a stream of traffic. The form of partial sequence integrity offered in IPsec is referred to as anti-replay integrity, and it detects arrival of duplicate IP datagrams (within a constrained window). This is in contrast to connection-oriented integrity, which imposes more stringent sequencing requirements on traffic, e.g., to be able to detect lost or re-ordered messages. Although authentication and integrity services often are cited separately, in practice they are intimately connected and almost always offered in tandem
4.3 How IPsec works and the work mode
4.3.1 how IPsec works
IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security services Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).Both protocols are described in detail in their respective RFCs. IPsec implementations MUST support ESP and MAY support AH. (Support for AH has been downgraded to MAY because experience has shown that there are very few contexts in which ESP cannot provide the requisite security services. Note that ESP can be used to provide only integrity, without confidentiality, making it comparable to AH in most contexts.)
The IP Authentication Header (AH) offers integrity and data origin authentication, with optional (at the discretion of the receiver) anti-replay features.
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol offers the same set of services, and also offers confidentiality. Use of ESP to provide confidentiality without integrity is NOT RECOMMENDED. When ESP is used with confidentiality enabled, there are provisions for limited traffic flow confidentiality, i.e., provisions for concealing packet length, and for facilitating efficient generation and discard of dummy packets. This capability is likely to be effective primarily in virtual private network (VPN) and overlay network contexts.
Both AH and ESP offer access control, enforced through the distribution of cryptographic keys and the management of traffic flows as dictated by the Security Policy Database.
These protocols may be applied individually or in combination with each other to provide IPv4 and IPv6 security services. However, most security requirements can be met through the use of ESP by itself. Each protocol supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode, AH and ESP provide protection primarily for next layer protocols; in tunnel mode, AH and ESP are applied to tunneled IP packets. The differences between the two modes are discussed in next part.
IPsec allows the user (or system administrator) to control the granularity at which a security service is offered. For example, one can create a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between two security gateways, or a separate encrypted tunnel can be created for each TCP connection between each pair of hosts communicating across these gateways. IPsec, through the SPD management paradigm, incorporates facilities for specifying:
Which security protocol (AH or ESP) to employ, the mode (transport or tunnel), security service options, what cryptographic algorithms to use, and in what combinations to use the specified protocols and services, and
The granularity at which protection should be applied.
Because most of the security services provided by IPsec require the use of cryptographic keys, IPsec relies on a separate set of mechanisms for putting these keys in place. This document requires support for both manual and automated distribution of keys. It specifies a specific public-key based approach for automated key management, but other automated key distribution techniques MAY be used
4.3.2 Transport mode and Tunnel mode
Both AH and ESP support two modes of use: transport and tunnel mode. The operation of these two modes is best understood in the context of a description of AH and ESP respectively
1. transport mode
There provide an overview of AH transport mode and ESP transport mode
AH transport mode
In transport mode, AH is inserted after the IP header and before a next layer protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.) or before any other IPsec headers that have already been inserted. In the context of IPv4, this calls for placing AH after the IP header (and any options that it contains), but before the next layer protocol. The following diagram illustrates AH transport mode positioning for a typical IPv4 packet, on a "before and after" basis
IPv4’s AH transport mode
In the IPv6 context, AH is viewed as an end-to-end payload， and thus should appear after hop-by-hop, routing, and fragmentation extension headers. The destination options extension header(s) could appear before or after or both before and after the AH header depending on the semantics desired. The following diagram illustrates AH transport mode positioning for a typical IPv6 packet
IPv6’s AH transport mode
ESP transport mode
In transport mode, AH is inserted after the IP header and before a next layer protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.) or before any other IPsec headers that have already been inserted. In the context of IPv4, this calls for placing AH after the IP header (and any options that it contains), but before the next layer protocol. (Note that the term "transport" mode should not be misconstrued as restricting its use to TCP and UDP.) The following diagram illustrates AH transport mode positioning for a typical IPv4 packet, on a "before and after" basis
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