2. The empirical facts
The initial public offering (IPO) is usually the largest equity issue a company ever makes. Every year IPOs account for about one-third of all the funds raised in the marketplace through common equity. The process of going public is also one of the channels through which an entrepreneur or venture capitalist cashes in the rewards for his/her initial efforts in setting the enterprise and making it successful.
As a consequence, until the beginning of the 1980’s, the decision to “go public” was almost unanimously considered a stage of the more complex evolutionary process of a corporation. The financial shakeouts that followed made this interpretation no longer sustainable. By the end of 1989, the U.S share in the world market capitalization shrank from 53.3 % to 29.9 % . The country had experienced a major wave of public, often large and mature firms going private, despite a growing economy and a long bull market.
Why companies chose and still choose to go public, why they may revert back to private ownership and whether their initial decision is temporary or permanent is one of the puzzles the iterature of the recent years tried to explain and rationalize .
According to Kaplan (1991), most of the neo-private companies are neither short lived nor permanent. He estimates that only 50 % of large leveraged buy-outs (LBO) become public again within seven years after the LBO transaction took place. Moreover, 7 % of the companies in his sample that went through a public offering went back private again later.
会计论文参考文献及英文文献翻译Corporate control appears as an important, although previously almost unexplored, aspect of the problem. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1994) observe that usually, in the three years following an IPO, turnover in control tends to happen twice more frequently than in the case of similar yet privately held companies. The effect seems to be even stronger for IPOs of wholly owned subsidiaries of publicly traded companies (the so-called equity carve outs).
These facts suggest that the decision to take a company public (and to maximize the revenues that follow for the initial entrepreneur) should be addressed by taking into proper consideration the issue of corporate control afterwards. If the desire to maximize the proceeds deriving from the sale of control is an important motivation underlying an IPO, then a high turnover in control should be observed in the years following the initial public offering. Rydqvist and Hogholm (1994) document this phenomenon for Sweden. They report that control changes hands in 36 % of IPOs within five years after the equity sale, while 34 % of U.K. IPOs are taken over within five years of listing. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1994) compare control turnover after an IPO with the normal turnover in control occurring in the same years among privately held firms in Italy. They find that the former is twice as large as the latter. Although these figures suggest a high turnover in control, they do not clearly prove that control turnover is abnormally high in Europe after an IPO. The U.S. evidence is, if possible, even less conclusive: Mikkelson and Shah (1994)report a 29 % turnover in control in the five years following the IPO for established firms, defined as firms with more than five years of sales history, while turnover is only 13 % for IPOs of young startups. Even though these figures do not include transfers of control blocks, they would suggest that for younger companies financial considerations were prevailing in the decision of going public, while control considerations seem to be more relevant in the older group of companies.
上一页 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 下一页
消费税英文文献和翻译 第2页下载如图片无法显示或论文不完整，请联系qq752018766
