An important rationale for the original adoption of VAT in Europe was to facilitate trade by turning the then existing sales taxes into true destination-based consumption taxes both by ‘untaxing’ exports (and removing hidden subsidies) and by placing the taxation of imports and domestic production on the famous level playing field. While the theoretical necessity for this step in a world of at least imperfectly flexible exchange rates is still debated by some, on the whole VAT’s effects on trade have been considered to be largely beneficial, with economists applauding the level playing field for imports and
毕业论文结尾的论文致谢 governments generally paying more attention to the removal of barriers to exports. Recently, however, some (Desai and Hines 2002) have suggested that VAT may actually deter rather than facilitate trade in DTE. Others (e.g. Keen and Ligthart, 2002) have begun to explore in more detail the theoretical framework linking VAT, tariff reform, trade and welfare, turning up some interesting and to some extent disquieting results. Although, as is not uncommon practice has preceded both theory and econometrics since most DTE already have a VAT, much room remains for further theoretical and empirical work in this area. No doubt some interesting points will emerge from this literature in the future: for now, however, there seems no reason to call the fundamental soundness of VAT as the primary form of consumption taxation in the world into question. So long as countries have general sales taxes, VAT remains the best choice in virtually all circumstances.
Finally, analysis suggests have also recently begun to discuss the implications for VAT of the considerably larger underground or shadow economies found in DTE as compared to developed countries. Some analysis suggests that in the presence of a substantial ‘informal’ sector, a tax like VAT that falls on the formal sector acts to deter the growth and development of the economy as a whole (Emran and Stiglitz, 2002). Indeed, one recent study (Hines 2004) concludes that increasing consumption taxes definitely fosters the expansion of the hidden economy if (as seems plausible) the labor-intensity of production in that sector is greater than in the formal sector. Yet another study suggests that even governments aware of such problems may have nonetheless choose to impose higher taxes, including VAT, on the formal sector of the economy because with their relatively weak tax administrations the best way for them to raise revenue may be to increase barriers to entry to the formal sector, thus creating ‘rents’ that may then be taxed (Aurioll and Walters, 2003). All this is interesting and certainly well worth further exploration and discussion.
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