（B）But It Does Not Always Work Well 硼锗酸盐分子筛的研究进展
So VAT works, in most countries, even DTE, better than other forms of general sales tax. This does not, however, mean that it necessarily always works well. While there are many different reasons for this conclusion in different countries, only two points will be mentioned here. First, the policy process appears, almost inevitably, always to leave some problems in VAT design, and such problems are more likely to be exacerbated over time in the circumstances of DTE than those of developed countries. Secondly, as the background paper properly emphasizes, the right way to implement a VAT is through ‘self-assessment’. What is perhaps not emphasized sufficiently, however, is how far some DTE still seem to be from being able to run their tax systems on this basis.
Potential taxpayers have many ways to escape the fiscal system in DTE: they (or at least their tax base) may, for instance, flee abroad; or they may remain but hide in the shadow economy; or they may secure some form of favorable treatment by exerting influence in various ways to have changes made in the law or its interpretation; or, if somehow trapped within the taxation system, they may finally seek relief by forgiveness of arrears through amnesty laws. Indeed, in some cases they may combine all of these methods of avoiding taxation. In some DTE the record over the years suggests that such processes have been at work, given the discouraging picture of repeated erosion of the base of the VAT through concessions at many levels as well as general administrative weaknesses.
The initial VAT legislation, usually close to standard international models in DTE, as time goes on tends to become both more complex and to some extent ad hoc in how it is actually applied. The structure of VAT becomes littered with privileges and exemptions that minimize its revenue impact and make it difficult to manage. Sometimes, once concessions enter the system, they have been subsequently enlarged surreptitiously without quick response from the tax administration, becoming in effect almost a ‘self-assessment’ system without the necessary administrative systems and safeguards to support such a system. Concessions thus feed on themselves, encouraging taxpayers to lobby for still more concessions, just as tax amnesties create an incentive to defer payment in anticipation of future amnesties. Little assistance in coping with these complexities is offered in the way of taxpayer services. Nor is much done to guard against abuse, with most so-called VAT ‘audits’ in many countries amounting to little more than simple numerical checks. Widespread base erosion facilitates both evasion and also, when taxpayers are subject to audit, corruption. 三亚玉海国际度假酒店实习的总结报告 Those with influence often have their tax debts forgiven. VAT reality has in these ways failed to live up to VAT’s initial promise in some DTE.
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