With the tax base being eroded in such ways, governments hard-pressed for revenues are sometimes driven to discretionary and unpredictable enforcement efforts-collecting money where they can and (as the common problem with refunds suggests) keeping it when they get it. On the other hand, they have sometimes resorted to introducing still more legislative changes (such as VAT withholding) to close gaps arising from previous political and administrative decisions. In some DTE the result has been almost a continuous cycle of changes in the effective tax structure, subsequent erosion of the tax base, and unrelenting pressure on the tax administration to meet revenue targets. Those taxpayers who remain subject to the full rigor of the formal tax system in such countries face uncertain (and often increasing) tax burdens. No one can say with certainty how any transaction will be taxed today, let alone tomorrow. Savings and investment are deterred and misallocated. Trade may be discouraged as VAT refunds to exporters are not paid out but are instead kept in the treasury and used to meet budgetary needs. The shadow economy expands. Revenues fall, with the result that tax pressure is again increased on those who cannot escape, and the cycle continues.本文来自辣.文~论^文·网原文请找腾讯324,9114
The underlying problem when VAT performances is this dismal does not, as a rule, lie in poor tax design. Rather, it usually reflects one or both of two more basic problems. One problem is the existence of a fundamental gap between the institutional requirements for good VAT administration and the real fiscal institutions in place in a country. The other is the extent to which the VAT is in effect being used to reward political supporters or perhaps, in some countries, as an instrument of industrial or regional policy. As tax economists have long argued, even the best-designed tax concession or incentive is likely to prove a useful tool of public policy only when a country has both a stable macroeconomic environment and a stable political and administrative system. Since few DTE can meet these criteria, attempts to use VAT ‘incentives’ seem unlikely to yield good results.本文来自辣.文~论^文·网原文请找腾讯3249.114
Of course, relatively little can (or perhaps should) be said from outside a country about the inevitable political dimension of VAT. In contrast, however, as the background paper shows, much can be said, and often has been said, about how DTE should set up and run a VAT. Most of what is said on this subject in that paper is both sensible and probably correct. Nonetheless, it is striking how seldom many of the most obvious administrative truths about VAT seem to have been taken into account in practice. To illustrate, if a country does not collect VAT properly on imports it is unlikely to do much better with the more difficult application of the tax in the domestic economy. Yet some countries do not seem to do nearly as well as they should at the border-for instance, letting goods enter the country without paying tax (e.g. on the basis of an unsecured promissory note) or not applying exchange rate changes
石家庄正大律师事务所实习报告 immediately on invoice values. Even if VAT is collected effectively at the border, the uneven and halting horizontal flow of information between border agencies and the VAT officials responsible for ensuring the validity of claims for input credits and refunds often puts the integrity of the tax at risk.
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