会计政策的披露和分析师的预测英文文献和翻译 第4页

Disclosure data
The starting point for this study is the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research evaluations of annual report disclosure levels among leading non-financial companies worldwide (CIFAR 1995; 1993). CIFAR measures, on a scale from 0 to 100, firms' disclosure levels based on the inclusion or exclusion of 85 annual report items for the total disclosure index and 20 items for the accounting policy disclosure score.  Firms are not penalized for not disclosing non-applicable items. 高中班主任实习工作总结
The Appendix contains details on the items CIFAR includes in the various categories. In addition to scoring accounting policy disclosures, CIFAR also measures the comprehensiveness of the basic financial statements as well as the extent of disclosures of general information, stockholders' information and supplementary information. I compute non-accounting policy disclosures as a weighted average of these categories. Consistent results obtain when using factor analysis to extract a composite measure.
The CIFAR disclosure scores for both accounting policy disclosure scores and overall disclosure have undergone extensive validity tests (see Hope 2001; 2002a). For example, Frost and Ramin’s (1997) country-level rankings of accounting policy disclosures for five countries corroborate those of CIFAR. Comparing my own scoring of accounting policy disclosures against CIFAR's for a sample of 21 firms indicates substantial overlap (correlation 0.82). I have also compared CIFAR's overall disclosure scores vis-à-vis
various countries' "Best Annual Report Awards" and with Botosan's (1997) scores.
These comparisons provide further support for the validity of the CIFAR scores. On the basis of these examinations, I conclude that the CIFAR scores capture meaningful variation in corporate disclosure.
All data on analysts' forecasts are from the IBES Domestic and International Summary.
The mean forecast error and the standard deviation of forecasts are computed as the simple average across the fourth through sixth month following the fiscal year-end. For the forecast dispersion tests, the number of forecasts must exceed three. The focus of this study is on assessing the impact of disclosure generally, rather than at a particular announcement date. Thus, the annual report data need to be available to analysts when their forecasts are prepared. On the other hand, accounting policy disclosures are unlikely to be significantly associated with forecasts made immediately prior to the next earnings announcement.

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Flexibility in home country GAAP

For the extent of flexibility mangers have in choosing among accounting methods I use the measure developed by Basu et al. (1998).This index is based on an equal weighting of nine accounting areas that represent some of the major differences in international
financial reporting practices in the first half of the 1990s. For each of the accounting dimensions, Basu et al. (1998) assigned a score between 0 and 2, then summed the scores across all dimensions and finally assigned ranks to countries. For example, during the sample period, Australia required amortization of purchased goodwill but France permitted either writing it off to reserves or amortizing it over its useful life. This difference gave France a higher score for flexibility than Australia in the area of amortization of goodwill. With the Basu et al. index, Japan and the Netherlands rank as the sample countries with the highest degree of flexibility and the United States, Hong Kong and Canada as the least flexible. 中小型民营企业内部控制的现状问题原因及对策

Control variables

Table 1 provides definitions and data sources for the firm- and country-level control variables I employ. At the firm level, I control for three factors that proxy for analysts' difficulty in forecasting earnings, and for industry and the age of the earnings forecast. Variability in earnings should increase the difficulty of forecasting, so I expect a positive relation between earnings change and forecast dispersion and error. Moreover, because previous research documents that analysts find it difficult to forecast earnings for firms that show losses, I expect an indicator variable for negative earnings to be positively correlated with forecast dispersion and error. Firms that are highly levered tend to have more variable earnings, and hence I predict a positive sign for leverage. I include indicator variables for industry (i.e., IBES sectors), as some industries may be more stable over time than others. I also include a variable, percentage new forecasts, that controls for possible staleness of the IBES forecasts. I expect a positive relation with forecast dispersion and error.
In addition to the firm-level control variables, I include variables that attempt to capture cross-country variation in the difficulty in forecasting earnings. To the extent that income smoothing and managers' guidance to analysts vary by country, controlling for these factors is important. I include country-level measures of income smoothing and earnings guidance from Brown and Higgins (2001).Both these variables should be negatively related to forecast dispersion and forecast error.

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