The method is basically a two-stage approach for allocating indirect costs to products based on cost drivers of various levels. In the first stage, resource costs (labour, equipment and power) are assigned to those activities performed in the organisation. During the second stage, activities costs are assigned to the cost objects based on selected cost drivers (e.g., machine set-up, quality inspection and material handling activities), which express a causal relation between the activity demand and the cost object considered. Besides the fact that ABC permits to directly trace manufacturing costs to products, it is possible to determine the costs related to objects different from products, e.g., product family, services and clients.
However, the main contribution of ABC to the operations management area is the
process view incorporated by the method. The information produced by ABC cost systems can increase process transparency, providing guidance to identify non-value-adding activities and take the necessary corrective actions (Kaplan & Cooper, 1995).
专利政策问卷调研暑期社会实践报告Notwithstanding the benefits of its application, ABC presents some drawbacks when compared to traditional cost systems. Perhaps, the most important one is the larger amount of data usually needed in ABC systems. Indeed, according to some authors (Krieger, 1997; Cokins, 1999), the excessive level of detail is a major cause of unsuccessful ABC implementations. This problem can be even worse when one considers unstable and complex production processes, such as those observed in the construction industry.
Despite its wide utilisation in manufacturing companies and its capability to increase the transparency of production processes, ABC has been poorly discussed in the construction literature. The few existing studies usually restrict the discussion of ABC concepts to academic applications (Maxwell et al., 1998). Therefore, there is a clear need to discuss the use of ABC concepts and principles in the construction environment. As other manufacturing concepts and practices transferred to construction, ABC has to be translated and adapted (Lillrank, 1995).
3. An application of activty-based concept in the construction industry
The recent literature attempts to answer some of the questions arising from the empirical evidence presented in the previous paragraph follows two apparently distinguished but often interrelated approaches. The first one, that we will here call “market-normative”, tries to identify the market mechanism by which a previously privately held company becomes public as the device to cope with heterogeneity of investors, market-segmentation and the relationship between informed and uninformed trading, departing from the more general competitive Walrasian-type offering process. The second one, while maintaining the more traditional competitive structure for the capital markets, faces more explicitly the issue of corporate control, and the trade-off between monitoring, liquidity and risk-sharing as the main determinant of a large investor’s decision about whether to “raid” a company or not.
We will refer to the latter as the “monitoring” literature. 本文来自辣.文~论^文·网原文请找腾讯324.9114
Both approaches rely heavily on two early contributions by Grossman and Hart (1980) and Kyle and Vila (1991) on the issue of free-riding, noise trading and the likelihood of a takeover to take place for a publicly held corporation.
Grossman and Hart, in their breakthrough paper, are faced with the common belief that a widely held corporation that is not being run in the best interest of its existing shareholders will be vulnerable to a takeover bid. This argument, very popular but by then unproven, originates from the existence of an “original” free-riding problem associated with the “delegation of power from many to few”. No individual has a large enough incentive to devote time and resources to ensuring that his/her representatives are acting in the best interest of the principals. The agents serve a Public Good, the well-being of the corporation, whose benefits are enjoyed by the vast collectivity of shareholders. As apparently none of them can be excluded from that Public Good, the social benefit of the monitoring activity and the cost that is usually attached to it frequently outweigh the private benefit to any of the individual principals in exerting such an activity. Inother terms, the benefits of monitoring the managers’ activity are a Public Good in a market economy and each individual shareholder has a strong incentive to free-ride in its production.
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