performance evaluation perspective is positively related. Additionally, based on the agency-framework provided by Gjesdal (1981), Bushman et al. (2006) show that simple adjustments to the model assumptions lead to a situation in which information requirements of shareholders and managers coincide. Hence, they conclude that accounting information used by investors to value the firm can also be optimal from the perspective of stewardship. Consequently, researchers have started to analyze the links of financial reporting regimes with the informational properties of optimal managerial accounting systems (Hemmer and Labro, 2008; Scholze and Wielenberg, 2007).
企业创新调查问卷表 -
Performance measures based on accounting information play an important role in both financial and managerial accounting. In theory as in practice, residual income is often seen as an indicator for value creation from the perspective of shareholders. Unfortunately, the residual income of a single period does, in isolation, not provide an answer to the problems of decision making and stewardship. In this context, the question has been raised whether residual income is able to explain changes in stock values and therefore provide information about actual value creation. A number of studies examine the correlation between market values and EVA as well as other versions of residual income. However, their results are contradictory. For instance, Liang and Yao (2005) examine the value relevance of EVA® in the Taiwan’s Information Electronic Industry resulting in a correlation of 13.47% between stock price and residual income as the performance measure. In contrast, in a 10-year-study by O’Byrne (1996), EVA® exhibits a correlation to stock prices of 74%. As a consequence, Biddle et al. (1997) point out that earnings outperform EVA® in most cases. Residual come is therefore not an ideal periodic performance measure. Its connection to value does not exist in a single period, the link only exists in a dynamic context.
As a consequence, the use of residual income in incentive schemes may lead to myopic behavior by managers. In order to provide managers with incentives to act in the best interest of the owners, a periodic connection between residual income and value is sought for (so-called strong goal congruence). The literature analyses accounting rules regarding their ability to achieve strong goal congruence (e.g. Baldenius and Reichelstein,
2005; Dutta and Reichelstein, 1999, 2002, 2005; Dutta and Zhang 2002; Mohnen and Bareket, 2007; Pfeiffer and Schneider, 2007; Reichelstein, 1997, 2000; Rogerson, 1997; Wagenhofer, 2003). As a result, special accounting rules such as the relative benefit depreciation-scheme are required to achieve strong goal congruence. In general, accounting
5 rules are considered goal-congruent, when a project with positive NPV results in a positive
expected residual income in any period. The manager will then have a strong incentive to
accept the project. To the contrary, an accounting rule that results in negative residual income in earlier periods may lead to under-investment.
In this context, Schultze (2005) examines the information content of goodwill impairments under FAS 142. He concludes that impairment can be due to several reasons, not only to a deteriorating economic performance. In particular, the adaption of information which results from impairment testing may have undesirable effects on managements’ decisions. Due to its negative effect on income, the goodwill impairment may lead to a discrimination of economically viable projects. In particular, he shows that in some cases goodwill impairments result from purely technical reasons. An impairment loss will occur when investing activities, increases in the fair values of assets or newly created intangible assets, increase the fair value of net assets. Consequently, goodwill accounting information has to be treated carefully in the context of performance measurement.关于繁体字使用情况的调查报告
As a consequence, the use of residual income for measurement as well as for rewarding purposes is critical. The reason lies in the missing connection between the value creation of a particular period and residual income of that period. In view of this deficit, O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) establish the "missing link" between residual income and value creation [3]. They present a joint measure of value creation and value realization, termed "excess value created" (EVC) as a measure of the managers' success in these tasks (Ohlson 2002). EVC consists of two components, promised goodwill (GW) and realized goodwill. Promised goodwill is considered the result of an infinite series of excess returns (Johnson and Petrone, 1998) and therefore is equivalent to the present value of the expected future residual income. Realized goodwill is identical to all residual income (RI) earned and accumulated to date t, accrued at the discount rate
EVC thus includes the value generation which has already been realized and the value creation which was initiated but is still to be realized in the future. In other words, a segregation of the past and the future part of value creation is achieved (Ohlson, 2002). In
so doing, O’Hanlon and Peasnell (2002) provide the link between goodwill accounting and
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