Firms were assigned to the third category “range of discount rates”, where they provided details of discount rates employed for the purpose of recoverable amount modelling and impairment testing, but rather than specifying a particular discount rate used in the context of testing for impairment in a particular CGU, simply provided details of a range of discount rates used across a range of CGUs. It is questionable whether this practice fulfils the disclosure requirements stipulated under AASB 136, and it is clear that the quality of this form of disclosure is lower than in categories one and two, above. 本文来自辣^文,论-文·网原文请找腾讯752018766
Finally, where the degree of information provided in relation to discount rates was so limited that it would not sustain any meaningful external evaluation, firms were assigned to a fourth category, labelled “no effective disclosure”. These firms were judged not to have complied with the relevant requirements of AASB 136, and the quality of their disclosures was poor.
In contemplating the quality of disclosures relating to growth rates as required under AASB 136, a similar methodology was employed, with firms also characterised according to a four point taxonomy, anchored at the high quality end by the
单片机MSP430氯气联机检测系统外文文献及翻译 category “multiple growth rates and periods for each CGU” and “no effective disclosure” at the low quality end. Two intermediate categories “single growth rate and period for all CGUs” and “partial disclosure only” (in that order of assessed quality) filled out the scale. The results of the analytical procedures employed for the purposes of the study are reported in section 4, below.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first group of analytical procedures performed on the data gathered for this study focused on the use of CGUs as an element of the impairment testing process. A threshold question of interest was the degree to which the total reported value of each sample firm’s goodwill could be completely reconciled to the sum of the goodwill values disclosed as having been allocated that firm’s defined CGUs. Inspection of the financial reports of the fifty firms comprising the final research sample revealed three distinct clusters of practice.
The first and dominant cluster comprised 41 firms for which a reconciliation of the type described above was possible. These were assessed as being fully compliant with the disclosure requirements of AASB 136. The second cluster comprised 3 firms in relation to which all goodwill bar an immaterial portion29 had been allocated to a CGU. These firms were assessed as being ostensibly compliant with the disclosure requirements of AASB 136. The third cluster comprised 6 firms where it was not possible in any meaningful way to draw a link between the value of reported goodwill and any of the firm’s defined CGUs. These firms were assessed not to have complied with the requirements of AASB 136. These details are set out in Table 2, below.
Although the difference between the firms classified as fully and ostensibly compliant turns on the fact that in the first category total firm goodwill can be reconciled to the sum of goodwill allocated to CGUs whereas in the second immaterial differences between total firm goodwill and the dollar value of goodwill allocated to CGUs arise, it is nonetheless argued that the quality of disclosure of those firms in the first category is higher than that of those in the second. ANZ bank represents a case in point. As at 2006, ANZ reported total goodwill of $2.9 billion. All of this bar $72 million was allocated to a CGU.
According to the letter of the standard, the $72 million not allocated to a CGU (or its sub components) is not material when judged against the total dollar value of that organisation’s goodwill – hence a case can be made that notwithstanding a failure to fully allocate goodwill to CGUs, the organisation’s disclosures are nonetheless compliant. However, technical compliance and disclosure quality are not necessarily fully concomitant constructs. The amount unreconciled in this case still represents a substantial sum31 and the degree of clarity achieved in the financial statements would arguably have been improved had a complete reconciliation been possible. 本文来自辣^文,论-文·网原文请找腾讯752018766
However, the greatest surprise in the data lay not in the fact that there were a small number of instances in which there was substantial though not total reconciliation between total recognised goodwill and the sum of CGU goodwill allocations, but rather in the existence of six of fifty (12%) members of the sample in which no meaningful disclosure in relation to the allocation of goodwill to CGUs is evident.
In one of these six firms, Macquarie Bank, it is possible that this can be explained by reason of a materiality based argument though the accounts are simply silent on the issue – and this explanation is judged in any event to be debateable in all the circumstances32. However, in the remaining five cases judged as instances of non compliance, there is no apparent explanation at all for the lack of allocation of goodwill to CGUs33. This means that financial statements users are left to take entirely on faith the notion that there has not, in the reporting period, been an impairment of goodwill. Further, readers of the financial statements issued by these organisations have less information with which to form judgements about future potential impairment events than the recipients of financial statements prepared by fully compliant firms.
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