Of course, as argued in the previous section of this paper, the failure to fully allocate recognised goodwill to all defined CGUs is not the only notable risk issue with these objects. Perhaps a greater challenge to transparency and information quality stems from the possibility that an organisation allocates goodwill to too few CGUs. This could result in the avoidance of
彩票方案的优选模型-数学建模论文 - impairment charges where they would otherwise be necessary by reason of the volatility smoothing effect of combining non perfectly correlated asset portfolios, even though the constituent elements of these aggregated asset portfolios could be argued to be capable of generating independent streams of cashflows at a much lower level of aggregation than that implied by a reporting entity in choosing to define fewer rather than more CGUs for the purpose of impairment testing.
Thus, testing for the possibility of inappropriate CGU definition aggregation represents an important line of inquiry in assessing the degree to which impairments pursuant to the AASB 136 regime are likely to be recognised in a timely fashion and in assessing the quality and meaning of disclosures made by firms the subject of the standard’s regime. Some summary data pertaining to this is set out in Table 3, below.
Contemplation of these results is best contextualised by reference to paragraph 80 of AASB 136, which sets out the framework pursuant to which firms define CGUs for the purpose of impairment testing. This suggests that CGUs or groups of CGUs to which goodwill is allocated for the purpose of impairment testing ought represent the lowest level within the firm at which goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes and that the CGUs so defined ought not be larger than segments as reported on by the entity pursuant to AASB 114 – Segment Reporting.
Unfortunately, it is arguable that the two legs of this CGU definition process have the potential to be mutually contradictory, since there is the possibility that goodwill is internally monitored at a far higher level of aggregation than that implicit in the business segments defined by the firm to satisfy the requirements of AASB 114.
Nonetheless, a starting point for assessing the manner in which firms define CGUs and allocate goodwill to them is to assume that the number of business segments defined by a firm represents a minimum value for the expected number of CGUs defined by a firm. It is not necessary that this condition be demonstrated to reflect the underlying factual substratum of each firm to which it is applied in order for it to yield potentially useful insights. Rather, the use of this comparison as an initial benchmark allows more ready identification of disclosure outliers worthy of further investigation.
Bearing this in mind, the data in Table 3 suggests that there are plausible reasons for concern about the risk of inappropriate CGU definition aggregation. Only 16% of the firms in the research sample defined more CGUs than business segments (suggesting a lower risk of aggregation concerns), while in a further 28% of observations, the number of defined CGUs was equal to the number of defined business segments. However, in more than half of all cases, the number of CGUs defined was lower than the number of defined business segments. In some cases, as few as one CGU was defined, suggesting a heightened risk of inappropriate CGU aggregation, with all the implications for the rigour of goodwill impairment testing which flow from that phenomenon.
5. CONCLUSION
Compared against the previous regime, the IFRS framework for goodwill reporting, accounting and impairment testing has introduced a very high degree of complexity and detail. The disclosures required under the standard are highly intricate, a factor which no doubt adds cost and risk to the task of preparing and auditing financial statements. However, it can equally be argued that the level of transparency achieved where disclosures are prepared in close accordance with the requirements of this new framework far transcends that which resulted from the application of the previous regime.
Unfortunately, the results of this study suggest that on the whole, this potential for high transparency is not translating into actual improvements in transparency in practice. Rates of clear non compliance with the edicts of AASB 136 were surprisingly high, and cases where the types of highly specific disclosures discussed in that standard were actually produced were strikingly rare. 本文来自辣^文,论-文·网原文请找腾讯752018766
Thus far then, the overall report card for Australian firms reporting on goodwill impairment under the IFRS regime is materially blotted. It may be that this is simply the manifestation of a lack of accumulated experience with the dictates of the new regime, and that the observed cases of non compliance and the generally poor disclosure quality observed in this study will ebb away over time. That is a question of fact the answer to which will only become evident in future.
It has not been the objective of this study to attempt to explain why compliance levels and disclosure quality have varied so measurably, even in the context of a relatively small sample. No doubt researchers interested in this phenomenon will probe these questions in future in search of possible answers. For the present, the results of this paper stand alone and serve as a reminder that notwithstanding the existence of intricate reporting rules, auditing frameworks and the constant scrutiny of capital markets, it is as well not to take the existence of reporting quality and consistency for granted.
The results also serve to remind academic researchers of the potentially important role they can play in monitoring key economic and social institutions and in informing the policy frameworks within which these institutions operate. The transition to IFRS has opened a substantial number of potentially productive channels for work of this nature, and it is to be hoped that many researchers capitalise on these opportunities over coming years.
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