PAT holds that data are not the final arbiter of a theory. Rather there is a complex interplay between theory and data. Thus, anomalous evidence does not automatically lead to the rejection of a theory. A theory is to be abandoned only when a competing theory with greater explanatory power emerges. Thus, the choice between theories is rational and accounting knowledge is cumulative in nature.
However, this paper argues that PAT’s methodological position on theory choice runs into difficulty. It is argued here that holding that a theory is replaced when a competing theory with greater explanatory power emerges does not resolve the theory choice problem rationally. If no theory with greater explanatory power emerges all on a sudden, the criterion of greater explanatory power cannot be applied at the initial stage of development of a theory. Rather this criterion is to be applied at some later stages of development. Thus, three important methodological questions are: (a) how to decide rationally whether to give chance to a new theory? (b) at what stage should the criterion of greater explanatory power be applied to choose from among competing theories? and (c) finally, how to choose from among two competing theories when one theory explains some phenomena explained by the other and some phenomena not explained by the other? PAT proponents are silent on this issue.
It is also important to note the role of value judgment in PAT. The role of value judgment and belief is larger than W & Z (1986: 8) would like to admit. They admit the role of value judgment in the choice of the research topic and choice of model. However, that role is much less in evaluation of research. When a research program follows what Kuhn (1996) calls ‘normal science’, as PAT does, the community of researchers must have some belief in the future of that program.
This paper notes two difficulties in PAT. First, it is difficult to determine reliably the intention of management making accounting choices. Second, though the basic tenet of earnings management (i.e., management incentives influence accounting choices) seems to be quite general, the generalizability of specific hypotheses that PAT examines is limited by institutional environments and time. Thus, as long as differences in institutional environments persist in the world, we may not experience a global PAT. However, this is not unique to accounting. Rather it is endemic to social sciences.
References
Ahmed, A. S. and Duellman, S. (2007), ‘Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics: An empirical Analysis’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 43, pp. 411-437.
Ball, R. J. and Brown, P. (1968), ‘An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers’, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 6 (Autumn), pp. 159-178.
Basu, S. (2004), ‘What Do We Learn from Two New Accounting-Based Stock Market Anomalies’? Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 38, pp. 333-348.
Beaver, W. H. (1968), ‘The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements’, Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, supplement to Vol. 6 of Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 67-92.
Beaver, W. H., Clarke, R. and Wright, W. (1979), ‘The Association Between Unsystematic Security Returns and the Magnitude of Earnings Forecast Errors’,
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