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Among other difficult problems to sort through here is the apparently unjustified two-fold assumption that there is one fundamental theory of meaning which applies to all paradigms, i.e., the meanings of expressions within any particular paradigm are determined by the rules of the paradigm, but, by contrast there is no single theory of meaning that allows for comparison of expressions across paradigms. However, if we can assert that all paradigms provide meanings for the terms which occur in that paradigm through the specification of rules, then why can we not, in the same meta-language in which we pronounce this dictum, then create another paradigm with the express purpose of allowing for the comparison of expressions? It is, for example, not at all obvious that the ways by which terms are made meaningful is through the specification of rules. That is, however, the account we are considering, and it is the source of Kuhn’s problem of incommensurability. That much has been stipulated through Kuhn's account of a paradigm. But, unless something further prohibits us from doing so, surely we can say something like this: for the purpose of comparing two expressions, each drawn from a different paradigm: If the results of applying those expressions in the meta-language, according to the rules of the meta- language, is the same, in the meta-language, then for all accounts and purposes those two expressions mean the same thing. In short, if two expressions drawn from two different scientific theories yield the same result when transported intoa third theory, then they can be said to make the same claim.
The solution is based on our account of engineering knowledge. If something formulated in the context of one paradigm can be used successfully in another, then deep philosophical problems about obscure theories of meaning recede. To treat the problem of incommensurability this way is not to solve it as much as to ignore it. This too may not be a bad thing. There are many philosophical problems still around to which we no longer pay attention since they seem beside the point, for example consider the pseudo problem of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? It is not clear that this problem was ever solved, but who cares? And so to the problem of incommensurability. If the problem as stated was never solved it appears not to matter. This lack of concern is a function of having shifted our ground from worrying about providing an abstract philosophical justification for something that only philosophers worry about to a pragmatic condition of success: Consider the consequences of using this claim from this theory in this context. If it solves our problem, then does it matter if we fail to have a philosophical justification for using it? To adopt this attitude is to reject the primary approach to philosophical analysis of science of the major part of the twentieth century, logical positivism, and to embrace pragmatism. This is a good thing to do, especially when we are concerned with technologies that have real world effects.
Finally, I noted that engineering knowledge was transportable, not just across fields but throughout the world (and perhaps beyond). Anticipating an objection from my colleagues concerned with various manifestations of cultural imperialism – let me attempt to forestall such issues. I am not saying that we should transport such knowledge. The appropriateness of such activities is a matter for policy considerations. That is not what I am talking about here.
Returning now to the issue I proposed at the beginning – that engineering knowledge is a more secure form of knowledge than scientific knowledge is, on the very grounds by which it is alleged that scientific knowledge is our best form of knowledge. However briefly, we have noted that scientific knowledge is transitory – that it changes as theories change. We have also noted that scientific method is likewise not only transitory, but unstable, depending on the area of science being discussed, not only is there no method that will work across the sciences, within a science, the nature of the domain of objects being investigated may suggest different methods; compare biochemistry with botany. Finally if scientific knowledge is to be appraised through a pragmatic theory of knowledge, and given that the objective is explanation, then as theories change, explanations fail. The history of science then becomes the history of failed theories and unsuccessful explanations.